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ABSTRACT 
AMY C. CAIN: Education in Liberal Political Theories 
(Under the direction of Dr. Robert Westmoreland) 
 
 This paper examines two sources of conflict within the literature on education in 
liberal political theories: the proper justifications for a state-mandated education and the 
necessary standard for education in a liberal state. After arguing that a liberal state must 
offer a child-centered justification for the universal mandate and uphold an equality 
standard of education, this paper proceeds to examine two common objections to such a 
system of compulsory education in a liberal state. This paper concludes that the perennial 
objections based upon concerns for familial rights and pluralism do not present a 
significant obstacle for incorporating a system of compulsory education in a liberal state.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The origin of liberal political theories is traceable to a desire for social 
stability through tolerance of irreconcilable beliefs. These ideas eventually evolved 
into a family of theories addressing the relationship of liberty and the state which we 
now know as liberal political theories. Primarily, early calls for tolerance proposed an 
agreement of nonviolence between different religious sects. More than advocating 
complete acceptance of all religions, early proponents encouraged a modus vivendi in 
which different groups would compromise to reach an agreement on fundamental 
principles and tolerate differences in peripheral beliefs.1 These agreements, although 
originally intended to protect the stability of the state from the people, eventually 
promoted a line of thought in which liberty of conscience was justified independently 
of its role in social stability as an individual right which must be protected from the 
state.  
Many influential, contemporary defenses of liberty of conscience expand 
beyond the freedom necessary for achieving collective goals like social stability and 
protect individuals’ liberty from state intervention.2 Many modern liberal theories 
prioritize the liberty of individuals and propose a state which preserves the conditions 
under which this liberty can be exercised. Gaus, Courtland, and Schmidtz characterize 
 
1 Henry Kamen, The Rise of Toleration, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967): 69. 
2 Whether it is necessary for a liberal theorist to protect a scheme of liberties as opposed to a complete 
concept of liberty remains incredibly controversial, especially as a point of difference between classical and 
new liberals. This paper will treat theories protecting either a unified concept or a scheme of liberty as 
liberal.  
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liberal theories as guided by a form of the “fundamental liberal principle” which 
claims that because humans were in a state of total freedom before the emergence of 
the state, limitations of this freedom by the state must be justified.3 Prior to the advent 
of the state,  people were free to develop and pursue their own conceptions of the 
good. This “total freedom” includes complete liberty to form and pursue this 
conception independent of anyone else’s consent.4 As such, “[L]iberals accord liberty 
primacy as a political value.”5 Thus, the burden of proof lies with the state to justify 
any departures from complete liberty. 
While liberals may be able to rally around the defense of liberty, refining this 
concept of liberty and its justification remains a contentious issue in the literature. 
Conceptions of liberty are distinguishable within two families: negative liberty and 
positive liberty.6 Classical liberals, as well as many libertarian theorists, propose and 
defend a conception of negative liberty: liberty as the absence of external human-
caused barriers and constraints on one’s action.7 Perhaps the most influential liberty 
principle of this kind is that of John Stuart Mill which reads, “The only freedom 
which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as 
we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it.”8 For 
 
3 Gerald Gaus, Shane D. Courtland, and David Schmidtz, “Liberalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Stanford University, January 22, 2018, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/liberalism/. 
4 Gaus, Courtland, and Schmidtz. 
5 Gaus, Courtland, and Schmidtz. 
6 Some theorist, including Gerald MacCallum, deny a clear distinction between conceptions of negative and 
positive liberty; however, for the purposes of this paper, these differences relevant and will be treated as 
substantial. More information on this debate can be found in Ian Carter’s "Positive and Negative Liberty."  
7 Ian Carter, "Positive and Negative Liberty," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/liberty-positive-negative/. 
8 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978), 12.  
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Mill, a person’s potential to live an autonomous life in pursuit of his/her perception of 
the good requires limits on state power.  
“Right” liberals in this negative liberty tradition, such as the libertarian 
theorist Robert Nozick, defend liberty as primarily a right to non-interference by the 
state.9 Nozick describes his position as “rights as side constraints” which argues that 
“[t]he rights of others determine the constraints upon your actions.”10 As a 
consequence of his dedication to liberty as non-interference, Nozick’s conception of 
rights as side constraints limits the role and authority of the state to the prevention 
and punishment of rights violations. Nozick maintains that this conception limits the 
goals which a state may pursue to those which do not violate individuals’ liberty.11 
Even if social policies such as the redistribution of wealth would minimize overall 
rights violations, such policies cannot be pursued if even one person’s liberty is 
abridged.12 Although Nozick’s theory offers an extreme example of this conception of 
negative liberty, classical liberals stress this idea of liberty as non-interference even 
while defending a larger role for the state.  
“New” liberals conceive of liberty in the positive sense as not merely a right 
to non-interference, but also as a realized capacity to frame and pursue a conception 
of the good.13 These “left” liberals, as typified by John Rawls, attempt to preserve a 
“fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties”14 which allows a 
substantially more active role of the state and is consistent with substantial 
 
9 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 30. 
10 Nozick, 29. 
11 Nozick, 29.  
12 Nozick, 158-159.  
13 Ian Carter, "Positive and Negative Liberty."  
14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5. 
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restrictions of liberty. Later, Rawls defends liberalism as necessary for a society of 
fair cooperation amongst equal citizens.15 Justice provides citizens with equal rights 
within society due to individuals’ two moral powers – the potentialities to form a 
conception of the good and to give justice to others – and their powers of reason.16  
In each of these conceptions of liberalism, those which advocate negative 
liberty and those which defend positive liberty, the central justification is found on 
the individual level: the liberty of each person limits the power of the state. Thus, the 
permissibility or impermissibility of policies in a liberal state must be judged on this 
individualistic basis. 
In order to preserve the liberty of individuals to develop and pursue their own 
conceptions of the good, liberal theorists – in both the positive and negative liberty 
traditions – propose a neutral state. Liberal theories defend a state that is neutral in 
regard to differing conceptions of the good, yet the justification for this neutrality 
differs for political liberal theories and comprehensive political theories. Although 
neither sect of liberalism claims to be entirely amoral, a “political” liberal theory, as 
the later Rawls understands the term, proposes political principles which avoid 
appealing to any comprehensive conceptions of the good.17 Political principles can be 
agreed upon by all reasonable persons in society, regardless of their personal 
conceptions of the good.18 These neutral principles form the moral content of the 
liberal state.19  
 
15 Rawls, 15. 
16 Rawls, 19. 
17 Charles Larmore, "Political Liberalism," Political Theory 18, no. 3 (1990): 341. 
18 Larmore, 341.  
19 Larmore, 341.  
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In contrast to this family of liberal theories, comprehensive theories, such as 
those liberal theories proposed by Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, justify 
neutrality with appeals to controversial conceptions of the good, both of which are 
enveloped in the term “individualism.”20 As Charles Larmore explains, “By 
remaining neutral with regard to controversial view of the good life, constitutional 
principles will express, according to them [Kant and Mill], what ought to be of 
supreme value throughout the whole of our life.”21 Larmore continues, “Their view 
was that the individualist value of self-development offers the best justification of the 
principle that the state should not promote one controversial view of the good life at 
the expense of others.”22 In order to support the claim that the state must remain 
neutral, comprehensive theories rely on contestable ideas of the good.23 Thus, 
comprehensive liberalism’s attempts to preserve state neutrality violate the very 
liberal ideals which it purports to uphold. Larmore describes political liberalism as 
positioned between the extremes of a controversial comprehensive liberalism and the 
purely pragmatic modus vivendi.24 This idea of political liberalism will be the ideal of 
neutrality against which liberal proposals will be measured in this paper.  
Within a neutral state, liberal theories recognize the liberty of individuals to 
pursue their own conception of the good and, as such, reject highly paternalistic 
intervention by the state which attempts to promote or discourage certain conceptions 
of the good. This anti-paternalism is a consequence of liberal theorists’ acceptance of 
 
20 Larmore, 343.  
21 Larmore 342-343.  
22 Larmore, 343.  
23 Larmore, 343.  
24 Larmore, 346.  
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irreducible pluralism: in a society in which people exercise their liberty in forming a 
conception of the good, there will be more than one fully reasonable conception of 
the good. In discussing the good as manifest in plans of life, John Rawls argues, 
“Since plans which it is rational to adopt vary from person to person depending upon 
their endowments and circumstances, and the like, different individuals find their 
happiness in doing different things.”25 This multiplicity of conceptions of the good is 
not the result of some people’s ineffective exercise of liberty. Rather, as Charles 
Larmore explains, “Reasonableness, by which I mean thinking and conversing in 
good faith and applying, as best as one can, the general capacities of reason which 
belong to every domain of inquiry, has ceased to seem a guarantee of unanimity.”26 
Thus, even equally cautious stewards of liberty and reason will arrive at various 
conceptions of the good. Liberals reject a paternalistic state because the state’s 
imposition of its own conception of the good precludes individuals’ liberty to 
discover and pursue their own idea of the good. However, children present a unique 
challenge to this idea.  
With this essential background, I turn to the core of my thesis: justifications 
and standards for education in a liberal state. Children have not yet formed their own 
conceptions of the good, so their potential to form these conceptions must be 
protected from indoctrination by both parents and the state. Stephen Macedo 
expresses this liberal concern in saying, “Indoctrination is antieducational whether it 
is undertaken by the government or by parents and churches.”27 This is motivated by 
 
25 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999): 359. 
26 Larmore, "Political Liberalism," 340. 
27 Stephen Macedo. "Crafting Good Citizens." Education Next 4, no. 2 (2004): 15. 
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the requirement of justice that their future choices and lifestyles be truly their own, 
including a right of exit from communities in which one was raised. Yet, in order to 
preserve the liberty of individuals in future society, each generation must retain a 
certain amount of knowledge and ability to continue the liberal state. Even when 
conceived in the minimalist form of negative liberty, citizens of a liberal state must be 
informed of their own rights which they may choose to exercise and the rights of 
others which they may not violate. These concerns for the liberty of children and 
stability of the liberal state, either individually or jointly, propel most liberal theists to 
incorporate universal state-mandated education into their theories.  
This recognition of the necessity of universal education branches into other 
areas of disagreement. Among such queries are these: who is responsible for funding 
education, who should provide the physical schools where this education will occur, 
what ideas can be taught in schools, what ideas must be taught in schools, and who 
has the final say in designing a student’s academic journey. Although discourse on 
educational theory rightfully includes considerations of both formal and informal 
institutions, this paper is primarily concerned with examining the questions related to 
the system of formal institutions in which children are educated from elementary 
grades through high school.28  
The first two sections of this paper critically examine two conflicts within 
educational theories on the liberal spectrum. Part I examines the differing justification 
for universal education in liberal political theories and explains these arguments as 
separable into groups which utilize society-sustaining justifications and those which 
 
28 For a discussion of this distinction see Alan Ryan’s "J.S. Mill on Education" page 657.  
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are individualistic and child-centered. This section argues that for an education 
system to be consistent with a liberal political theory, its justification must be 
individual and focused on the liberty and potential liberty of children. Part II 
examines a further division between liberal political theories which present arguments 
for an adequate level of universal education and those which argue for equality of 
education. After examining the discourse in this literature, I argue that equality of 
education is most consistent with liberal ideals.  
Having considered these divisions within discussions of education in liberal 
political theories, Parts III and IV examine and answer two perennial objections to 
mandating any level whatsoever of education in a liberal political system. Part III 
analyzes the objection that universal education violates parental rights and 
undermines the value of the family. Part IV confronts the concern that state-mandated 
education minimizes pluralism in a way that is inherently illiberal and argues that 
pluralism, while constrained by universal education, is constrained only for liberty’s 
sake. Thus, this limitation meets the requirements of liberalism. 
The ultimate section of this paper synthesizes the results of this analysis and 
concludes that further work is needed to explore the implications of these arguments 
for liberal theories not explored in this paper. In particular, Harry Brighouse’s work 
passes the liberal standards proposed in this work and would benefit from an analysis 
of the specific challenges to his book School Choice and Social Justice. 
13 
 
PART I: SOCIETAL VS. INDIVIDUAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
Education plays a foundational role in weaving together generations of 
citizens into a common culture. As the famous educational reformer, John Dewey, 
observed, society is dependent upon its ability to pass information to future 
generations. He explains, “Education, in its broadest sense, is the means of this social 
continuity of life.”29 Education provides a societal good in preparing children for their 
future roles in common life.30 While this would perhaps be easily achievable through 
an indoctrination of productive attitudes and beliefs, liberals are particularly 
concerned with the deleterious effects this will have on students’ liberty.  
Accordingly, liberals attempt to avoid Foucault’s conception of the modern 
school system. From Foucault’s perspective, educational institutions are merely a 
means by which society exercises power/knowledge to “maximize efficiency” and 
“neutralize dangers.”31 This approach, while sustaining a stable society, incorporates 
indoctrination practices that fail to treat children as individuals who will develop and 
pursue their own conceptions of the good. As Mill cautions, “…a State which dwarfs 
its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for 
beneficial purposes – will find that with small men no great thing can really be 
accomplished.”32 From Mill’s view, education is about presenting options to students, 
 
29 John Dewey, “Democracy and Education (1916),” Middle Works Bd 9 (1966): 2.  
30 Dewey, 6.  
31 James D. Marshall, “Foucault and Education,” Australian Journal of Education 33, no. 2 (1989): 108. 
32 Mill, On Liberty, 113.  
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not mandating belief.33 In crafting their educational systems, liberal theorists must 
balance a desire to perpetuate a liberal state with the desire to preserve the liberty and 
future liberty of students.  
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argues that “to bring a child into existence 
without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide good for its body, but 
instruction for its mind is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and 
against society.”34 Mill views universal education as both providing the public good 
of self-sufficient citizens and conferring individual goods in the form of “exalting and 
dignifying our nature.”35 This two-pronged justification for state-mandated education 
– preventing harm to society and injustice to the child – spawned two often 
competing schools of thought in liberal political theory. Although I argue that it is 
productive to divide the literature along the lines of societal and individual 
justifications, it is important to note that these justifications are not mutually 
exclusive in every theory. Theorists who offer forms of both justifications are noted 
even as their arguments are divided for separate analysis. This analysis begins by 
analyzing justifications for state-mandated education which rest upon a concept for 
maintaining a continuity of the liberal state.  
Stephen Macedo in “Liberal Civic Education and Its Limits,” argues for 
universal education on the basis that “peaceful, orderly, tolerant liberal diversity 
needs to be planned for.”36 According to Macedo, common schools (physical 
 
33 Graham Finlay, "Mill on Education and Schooling," A Companion to Mill (2016): 509.  
34 Mill, On Liberty, 104.  
35 Finlay, "Mill on Education," 504. 
36 Stephen Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Its Limits," Canadian Journal of Education/Revue 
canadienne de l'éducation 20, no. 3 (1995): 304 (original emphasis). 
15 
 
communal spaces in which classes are held) may be a matter of debate, but a basic 
level of common education is necessary in a political liberal system to ensure shared 
civic virtues.37 In particular Macedo sees education as fulfilling the responsibility of 
teaching students civil respect which he describes not as a skepticism about the truth 
of one’s own beliefs, but as an understanding between equal citizens that some views 
are irreconcilable.38 Because of the permanence of reasonable pluralism, citizens in a 
liberal state must be taught how to view their fellow citizens as deserving of equal 
respect in the political sphere even in the presence of disagreement about 
comprehensive conceptions of the good.39 As civil respect is essential for citizens to 
cooperate and continue the liberal state, the state must mandate an education which 
includes the teaching of this value. Thus, the system is ultimately justified in terms of 
the good which it provides the state.  
In "Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education," 
William Galston contends that because a basic level of knowledge is required to make 
reasoned decisions, the democratic state has an interest in maintaining this level of 
knowledge through mandated education.40 Galston asserts that no normative 
judgment is required to recognize that a democracy cannot survive without citizens’ 
civic engagement.41 This seems to be true by definition. If a democracy is a 
government whose decisions are made by the people, then an absence of people’s 
participation would equate to the absence of a democracy. Nevertheless, a moral 
 
37 Macedo, 304.  
38 Macedo, 308. 
39 Macedo, 307-308.  
40 William A. Galston, "Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education," Annual Review 
of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001): 218. 
41 Galston, 220. 
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judgment is required to make this need to sustain democracy the basis for a state-
mandated education in a liberal political system. In defense of this judgment, Galston 
merely prompts the reader to remember that education for citizenship was one of the 
primary reasons that the American public-school system was created.42 However, this 
historical fact does not provide a solid basis for this judgment as faulty reasons are 
not grandfathered into justice merely because of their antiquity. A full argument for 
this democracy-sustaining justification is noticeably lacking in the article.  
Callan builds upon the state-sustaining justifications defended by Macedo and 
Galston and takes them a step further by arguing that a liberal education system 
should actively instill the virtues of democratic liberalism. This expectation goes well 
beyond the requirements of a political process and instead promotes a liberal social 
society as well. He says that “a civic education worth its name will steel the spirit 
against the pull of liberal democratic heresy – it will be antiracist and 
antidiscriminatory, among other things.”43 This requirement marks a departure from 
liberalism restrained to the political sphere and, instead, mandates a comprehensive 
doctrine: “one which includes an overall theory of value, an ethical theory, an 
epistemology, or a controversial metaphysics of the person and society.”44 Callan’s 
system allows the state to institutionalize the teaching of a comprehensive conception 
of the good which violates the neutrality of the liberal state. Unlike Macedo who 
attempts to establish spheres of influence for teaching critical reflection and to 
 
42 Galston, 231. 
43 Eamonn Callan, "Citizenship and Education," Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 7 (2004): 75. 
44 Gerald Gaus, Shane D. Courtland, and David Schmidtz, “Liberalism.”  
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maintain the neutrality of political liberalism,45 Callan denies that the skills needed to 
analyze the political realm can be restricted to this domain.46  
If Callan is correct that a state-mandated civic education will always result in 
the teaching of comprehensive liberalism, then he presents a compelling argument 
against his own proposal. At its foundation, liberalism is neutral to comprehensive 
conceptions of the good.47 An education system which cannot maintain this neutrality 
is not helping to sustain a liberal state; rather, such a system promotes and perpetuates 
an illiberal state. As such, Callan’s proposal for a state-mandated education which 
actively instills the virtues of liberalism outside of the political sphere cannot be 
incorporated in a truly liberal system.  
Whatever their other defects, the primary objection to these state-centered 
justifications is that they deprioritize liberty. Liberty, whether understood in the 
negative or positive sense, is applicable to individuals.48 Justifications which center 
around continuity of the state wrongly deemphasize humanity’s freedom in the 
natural state. Whether classical liberalism, which defends a state that maintains 
individuals’ liberty of non-interference or new liberalism which proposes a state with 
more extensive powers to facilitate individuals’ realized liberty, liberal theories begin 
with individual liberty and theorize a state which preserves this liberty. Therefore, 
educational systems that give priority to concern for the state’s continuity are ruled 
out in principle by liberal theories. A liberal state-mandated education system must be 
conceived in the same way as the state itself: starting with individuals. Other liberal 
 
45 Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education," 311. 
46 Callan, "Citizenship and Education," 76; 82. 
47 For further discussion of the importance of neutrality in a liberal state, please see the introduction. 
48 See the introduction for further discussion of this point. 
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theorists, often in the Rawlsian tradition, offer individualistic justifications for 
universal education based upon the potential autonomy and freedom of exit of 
children.  
Amy Gutmann builds upon the Rawlsian tradition and the idea of primary 
goods in providing a child-centered justification for state-mandated universal 
education. Gutmann conceives of primary goods as “reflect[ing] a common 
understanding within society of what goods rational individuals, ignorant of their 
particular interests, would want provided for them within that society.”49 She argues 
that primary goods, which are chosen in a situation akin to Rawls’s original position, 
determine the extent of allowable paternalism because children do not yet have the 
developed reason to determine and express settled goals themselves. Thus, primary 
goods are likely to ensure the greatest range of reasonable choices for them as adults 
within society.50 Gutmann includes education, healthcare, family, and proper nutrition 
among the list of primary goods that properly define a society’s obligation to its 
children.51  
M. Victoria Costa argues that an educational system must actively engage in 
conversations about different conceptions of the good in order to preserve the liberty 
of students.52 She contends that this is consistent with Rawls’s political liberalism 
when it is applied to the reality of multicultural societies in which minority 
communities are often marginalized.53 She notes that while Rawls did not include a 
 
49 Amy Gutmann, "Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument," Philosophy & Public 
Affairs (1980): 341. 
50 Gutmann, 341. 
51 Gutmann, 340. 
52 M. Victoria Costa, "Rawlsian Civic Education: Political Not Minimal," Journal of Applied Philosophy 
21, no. 1 (2004): 13.  
53 Costa, 11.  
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detailed plan for an education system in his theory,54 he does argue that civic 
education is important so that individuals know their rights and do not remain in 
social groups merely because they do not have access to alternatives.55 Thus, in 
Costa’s view, the explanation of different conceptions of the good within a liberal 
education fulfills the state’s role of protecting a realized right to exit.  
Costa creates a false equivalence between freedom of exit and encouragement 
to exit. Costa seems to be endorsing a comprehensive conception of the good which 
prioritizes autonomy and self-reflection, yet education in this comprehensive ideal 
lies outside of the jurisdiction of a political liberal state. Freedom of exit does not 
require that one understands the complete list of available options. Rather, the 
exercise of this freedom requires that one knows his/her right to two options: this and 
not-this. By way of example, if a woman finds herself in an abusive marriage, her exit 
rights in a liberal state would include the legal right to exit that marriage; this does 
not require an education in the different types and forms of marriage and marriage 
alternatives.56 The state’s role is merely to ensure that she is informed of her right of 
exit and to guarantee that there will be no legal barriers to her exiting that situation. 
As explored by Sigal Ben-Porath, entrance paths after the point at which people 
exercise the right of exit are provided by a larger society when it accepts the exiting 
member and allows them to engage in “civic life, work, and leisure within dominant 
society.”57 These are the conditions of treating people as equal citizens, all of which 
 
54 Costa, 1-2. 
55 Costa, 6-7. 
56 Example borrowed from Sigal Ben-Porath, "Exit rights and entrance paths: Accommodating cultural 
diversity in a liberal democracy," Perspectives on politics 8, no. 4 (2010): 1030. 
57 Ben-Porath, 1026.  
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are included in the structure of a liberal state. Education in a multitude of ways of life 
goes beyond this basic duty of the liberal state and, instead, encourages students to 
pursue the ideal of autonomy and to seek out ways of life aside from those in which 
they were raised.  
Perhaps the most thorough child-centered justification for state-mandated 
education is provided in the work of Harry Brighouse. Defending a conception of 
positive liberty, Brighouse argues that all adults have an obligation to provide 
children with an equal education so that all children have an equal opportunity to 
develop into autonomous adults if they choose such an ideal.58According to 
Brighouse, to view education as a means to maintaining civil order is “precisely to 
treat children (and the adults they will become) not as potentially self-determining 
citizens but as subjects of a pre-determined order.”59This is, Brighouse argues, 
illiberal to its core. Brighouse dismisses education’s function in perpetuating the state 
as of secondary importance. He says, “Education’s status as a public good is 
irrelevant: that it is required by justice is what justifies state intervention.”60 Turning 
the tables on state-centered theorists, Brighouse presents the argument that state 
legitimacy is threatened by an education which primarily aims to perpetuate the state.  
Brighouse argues that the legitimacy of a liberal state is dependent upon its 
citizens continuously consenting to their government.61 In order for this consent to be 
freely given, citizens must be equipped with the skills to evaluate their government.62 
 
58 Harry Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000): 15; 2.  
59 Harry Brighouse, "Two Philosophical Errors Concerning School Choice," Oxford Review of Education 
23, no. 4 (1997): 508. 
60 Harry Brighouse, "Why Should States Fund Schools?," British Journal of Educational Studies 46, no. 2 
(1998): 151. 
61 Harry Brighouse, "Civic Education and Liberal Legitimacy," Ethics 108, no. 4 (1998): 720. 
62 Brighouse, 735. 
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He argues that this is achieved through an autonomy-facilitating education that is 
distinct from civic education.63 Importantly, this autonomy-facilitating education is 
independently justifiable. Brighouse argues, 
The fundamental interest each has in living well yields an obligation on all to 
provide prospective adults with an instrument for selecting well among ways 
of life. Confidence that others have a real opportunity to live lives that are 
good for them is only possible if we provide the means to select one.64  
 
Brighouse acknowledges the need for a just liberal state to maintain legitimacy from 
the consent of its people, yet he offers a completely independent justification for 
state-mandated education which is rooted in the individual liberty of children. 
Unlike a strictly civic education which is justifiable by its role in legitimizing 
the state, an autonomy-facilitating education is justified completely by society’s duty 
to children and, as a byproduct of this process, provides the option for legitimation of 
the state. According to Brighouse, this education includes (1) basic academic 
curriculum, (2) skills to identify fallacious arguments, (3) explanations of a full range 
of ethical views and their reasonings, and (4) training in how people have dealt and 
continue to deal with religious and moral disagreements.65 Brighouse argues that his 
autonomy-facilitating style of education preserves liberty more thoroughly than an 
autonomy-encouraging education. Whereas an autonomy-encouraging education 
promotes a certain conception of the good (namely, an autonomous life itself), the 
autonomy-facilitating education provides students with the tools to live an 
autonomous life if they should choose such a path.66  
 
63 Brighouse, 727.  
64 Brighouse, 731-732 (original emphasis).  
65 Brighouse, 732-733. 
66 Brighouse, 734.  
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Brighouse attempts to distinguish his own proposal of autonomy-facilitating 
education from autonomy-encouraging education by saying that the curriculum 
provides knowledge and skills instead of focusing on acquired virtues. However, the 
line between these concepts is not as distinct as he hopes.67 If a parent tells a child 
that he/she can choose any sport to play but also hands him/her a bat and glove, the 
parent has encouraged the child to choose baseball even if it was through actions and 
not words. Brighouse admits that in practice autonomy-encouraging and autonomy-
facilitating curricula may be indistinguishable.68 Nevertheless, Brighouse maintains 
that this subtle nuance is pivotal to maintaining the legitimacy of the state. By ruling 
out in principle, even if not clearly in practice, autonomy-encouraging education, 
Brighouse retains a student-centered justification for universal education while also 
providing an avenue by which this education provides an opportunity for the 
legitimization and preservation of the liberal state.  
From a historical standpoint, it is also worth noting that in American judicial 
precedent, child-centered justifications for universal education are given priority over 
state-centered concerns. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court based their ruling 
on considerations of whether the state’s interest was satisfied in producing citizens 
who would not be a burden on the state while also reflecting a concern for a child’s 
personal development and freedom of exit. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Burger argues,  
…the State is not concerned with the maintenance of an educational system as 
an end in itself; it is rather attempting to nurture and develop the human 
potential of its children, whether Amish or non-Amish: to expand their 
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knowledge, broaden their sensibilities, kindle their imagination, foster a spirit 
of free inquiry, and increase their human understanding and tolerance.69  
 
He adds,  
A State has a legitimate interest not only in seeking to develop the latent 
talents of its children, but also in seeking to prepare them for the lifestyle that 
they may later choose, or at least to provide them with an option other than the 
life they have led in the past.70  
 
This line of reasoning reflects a concern for the liberal concept of a child’s right of 
exit.  
These child-centered justifications for a state-mandated education fulfill the 
requirements of a liberal political system by prioritizing the liberty of individuals 
above the interests of the state. Theorists offering either justification – state-centered 
or child-centered – may offer equally robust education systems which allow 
significant state intervention in children’s liberty, and in practice, systems built on 
either foundation may look incredibly similar. The argument of this section is that 
only one of these families of ideas genuinely fulfills the requirements of a liberal 
system. I have argued that liberalism rules out in principle those educational 
requirements which are proposed to fulfill a state need rather than to protect the 
liberty and future liberty of students. The next section explores the standards of 
education which a liberal system must maintain following its justification on the basis 
of children’s liberty.  
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PART II: ADEQUACY VS. EQUALITY STANDARDS FOR EDUCATION 
 Having examined the proper justifications for a liberal education, this paper 
shifts to an analysis of the appropriate contents of a liberal state-mandated education. 
Due to the complexity of evaluating the particular curriculum defended by individual 
theorists, this paper proposes a simplified framework in which the substance of these 
systems can be scrutinized. From a big-picture view, standards of state-mandated 
educational achievement can be divided into two groups. The progression of liberal 
thought has witnessed a divide between theorists who argue for an adequate level of 
universal state-mandated education and those who defend an equal level of universal 
state-mandated education for all students.  
Beginning with John Stuart Mill, classical liberals often fall into the segment 
of theorists who defend an adequacy standard. For Mill, education is a parental duty 
that serves as a means to guarantee that children do not become a burden on the state 
while also dignifying the individuality of each student in allowing him/her the 
opportunity to live an autonomous life.71 The state’s primary educational function is 
to hold parents to their duty and to ensure a minimal standard for schools and 
teachers.72 Mill opposes a state monopoly on the provision of education; however, he 
contends that the state should administer yearly tests on basic subjects in order to 
“make the universal acquisition and, what is more, retention of a certain minimum of 
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general knowledge virtually compulsory.”73 Thus, while some students will achieve 
levels of education above this minimum, the state is justified in compelling all 
students to reach this adequacy standard.  
Graham Finlay presents a compelling internal objection to Mill’s adequacy 
standard. He says that in areas other than linguistics, reading, and math, Mill limits 
state-mandated education to merely the reproduction of facts which seemingly 
incentivizes behaviors counter to the development of critical thinking skills.74 This 
proposal seems to contradict Mill’s goals of dignifying individuals and providing the 
tools for an autonomous life. Finlay contends that this oversight is mostly due to 
Mill’s “lack of familiarity with the practicalities of education.”75 Mill’s attempt to 
limit the standard of compulsory content results in a failure to fulfill his proposed 
objectives for a liberal education.  
Mill’s On Liberty, in which he presents this conception of a minimal standard, 
was originally published in 1859, yet “adequacy” seems to have a different meaning 
for varying societies at various times. An education which adequately prepared 
students for the 19th century society and workforce of Mill’s day would be woefully 
inadequate in the 21st century where educational and employment opportunities are 
dependent upon some level of technological literacy. Many theorists who have 
defended an adequacy standard since Mill’s time attempt to incorporate mechanisms 
by which this standard of adequacy can evolve to meet the needs of children in each 
new generation and society. James Tooley offers a market system for this process.76 
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However, other contemporary liberal theorists avoid the problems associated with an 
evolving standard of adequacy and instead defend a standard of equal education for 
all students. Harry Brighouse is a prominent example of such a theorist. The 
discourse between James Tooley and Harry Brighouse exemplifies the argument 
between liberals on the right and left sides of the liberal spectrum. Tooley proposes 
minimal state intervention in his adequacy model of educational provisions while 
Brighouse argues for a system of state-involved education focused on equality of 
education amongst students. Their disagreement centers around the conflict between 
adequacy and equality standards of education.  
In Disestablishing the State, James Tooley challenges the idea that the state 
must be intimately involved in educational as a matter of necessity.77 In his work 
Tooley takes seriously the concerns of writers such as H.L. Mencken who worries 
that “the aim of public education is not to spread the enlightenment at all; it is simply 
to reduce as many individuals as possible to the same safe level, to breed a standard 
citizenry, to put down dissent and originality.”78 Tooley sees his theory as an antidote 
to these forms of Foucauldian and Millian fears. He proposes to build a bridge 
between those he refers to as “radical ‘deschoolers’” who object to any state 
involvement in education and those who do not even question whether government 
involvement is required in education.79 
Tooley challenges the idea that the state must be robustly involved in 
education by building on the work of E.G. West. West develops a “market model” of 
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education from a thought experiment which begins with the absence of state 
intervention in education and incorporates (1) the stipulation that parents are the 
default providers of education and (2) an infancy protection clause which allows for 
intervention in families if children are mistreated.80 In Tooley’s proposal, all state 
involvement in education is justified on the individualistic level of protecting 
children; thus, Tooley’s theory fulfills the initial requirements of a liberal educational 
theory defended in Part I.  
Extending West’s “market model,” Tooley argues that the state’s involvement 
in education should be limited to (1) regulation of a minimum standard of education 
through government inspection, (2) funding the education of children from families 
who are unable to pay, and (3) coercion of students to participate in education who 
would not do so willingly.81 Tooley argues that inspectors can use “rules of thumb” 
developed within their own cultures to decide when educational opportunities are 
insufficient.82 He contends that a “minimum adequate education could be ensured 
without the state being involved in promoting a particular curriculum.”83 Instead of 
defending even a very vague curriculum, Tooley contents himself with having “ruled 
out, for many readers, what seemed to be the very demanding curricula of education 
for democracy, and education for autonomy.”84  
In order to strengthen his own case for an adequacy standard for education, 
Tooley examines the educational proposals in other liberal political theories and 
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argues that an adequacy standard fulfills their requirements as well. Tooley contends 
that Rawls’s theory is compatible with West’s market model by arguing for a by-pass 
around the difference principle in regard to education.85 Rawls’s difference principle 
stipulates that social and economic inequalities are justified “only if the difference in 
expectation is to the advantage of the representative man who is worse off.”86  Tooley  
says, “…West’s ‘minimum adequate education for all’ satisfies Rawls’ position on 
equality of opportunity, with the proviso that instead of seeking the difference 
principle, we substitute what Rawls was seeking from it, namely a society with an 
adequate guaranteed minimum, or safety net.”87  
Tooley’s insistence on equivalence between adequacy and equality of 
opportunity is a point of contention for defenders of equality of education such as 
Harry Brighouse. Brighouse directly addresses Tooley’s qualms with Rawls in “Why 
Should States Fund Schools?” Brighouse rejects Tooley’s assertion that Rawls would 
accept an adequate safety net as a substitution for equal opportunity in education. 
Brighouse contends, “…since fair equality of opportunity is the key notion, prior to 
the difference principle (or any more defensible substitute), Rawls will still require 
life-prospects to be as insensitive as possible to family circumstances, even if he 
abandons the difference principle.”88   
Brighouse defends this claim with two sub-arguments. He concedes to Tooley 
that Rawls does allow for inequality of opportunity when such inequalities aid the 
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least advantaged.89 However, because inequalities in education will likely not fulfill 
this purpose in a single generation, Brighouse concludes that they are not allowed by 
Rawls’s theory.90 Additionally, Brighouse rejects such inequalities because children, 
the participants in the unequal system, would not understand the justification of such 
differences. He explains, “Children cannot be presumed to understand the social 
purpose of inequalities, which will appear to place greater value on the lives of 
beneficiaries.”91 On these grounds, Brighouse argues that Rawls’s theory supports an 
equality standard over an adequacy standard. 
Brighouse defends a standard of equality of education among all students as a 
matter of justice among equal individuals. Brighouse explains,  
Equal opportunity is desirable as a way of implementing a presumption of the 
equal moral worth of all persons. This is an individualist criterion: having 
society devote less resources to someone’s life for arbitrary reasons is not 
much less of an assault on his [or her] moral standing than having society 
license such discrimination on other bases.92 
 
He continues to argue that allowing students with wealthier parents to receive more 
educational resources than children of low-income families is, in fact, the sort of 
arbitrary allocation of society’s resources that denies moral equality between 
persons.93 Importantly, Brighouse is defending the position that society as a whole is 
responsible for this breach of justice if a child is not provided equal opportunities; 
thus, society is collectively responsible for preventing this injustice. Brighouse 
argues,  
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It is not good enough that people just happen to get what they have a right to: 
justice requires institutional guarantees. From the point of view of justice it is 
not good enough that an individual’s rights never happen to be violated: it is 
essential that we establish institutional forms which assure individuals that 
they can make and execute their life plans without fear of rights violations. 
The state is an indispensable means for doing this…94 
 
Brighouse argues that justice requires that children’s possibilities of securing societal 
goods, such as education or employment, not be limited by the intellect and resources 
of their parents (as would be the case in a market model) or their own aptitudes.95 For 
Brighouse, inequality is tracked by determining the degree to which inequality in 
educational resources correlates to inequalities in family economics, parental 
educational attainment, or abilities of the student.96 
 Tooley denies Brighouse’s equal-opportunity based objection to privatization 
of education on three grounds: (1) the impracticality of thinking that the state can ever 
provide genuine equality of opportunity, (2) the lack of incentives for parents to 
advocate for better schools, and (3) the assertion that equalizing schools will not 
equalize education.97 Brighouse admits that complete equality of education may be 
impractical, but in answering Tooley’s first and third objections, Brighouse argues 
that it matters not only where people are ranked on society’s ladder, but also how 
close the rungs are to each other.98 Although a liberal state may never achieve perfect 
justice, it maintains a duty to approach this ideal as closely as possible. As a response 
to Tooley’s second objection, Brighouse contends that because the intrinsic benefits 
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of education are positive-sum, parents will maintain an incentive to advocate for 
better schools in a public system.99 So, even if parents cannot provide their child with 
a competitive advantage by campaigning for improvements in her education, they will 
advocate for improvements in education which benefit their child and all other 
students.  
 Beyond his initial objections, Tooley isolates what he sees as a paradox in 
Brighouse’s argument: “that the more you equalise schooling, the more important 
family influence will become.”100 Brighouse offers suggestions to mitigate this 
influence, including lengthening the school day and providing assistance to 
disadvantaged families to aid in the upbringing of children in the home.101 He 
continues to endorse the suggestion that the state adopt zoning policies which actively 
disrupt the settlement patterns of class-based neighborhoods.102 However, these 
solutions seem to raise more problems for Brighouse’s theory. Without providing a 
thorough argument for each of these suggestions, Brighouse leaves himself open to a 
prima facie objection that such reforms exceed the justified powers of a liberal state 
and violate individuals’ liberty. This lack of support remains a problem to be explored 
in his work.  
 Tooley further argues that Brighouse’s work leaves open the possibility of an 
“efficiency argument” in favor of school privatization which says that if privatization 
were more efficient economically in providing the same education, then it would be 
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preferable to a public system.103 While this may be true, Tooley would need 
substantial empirical evidence to prove that this is indeed the case. Brighouse 
counters that Tooley can only argue that in some circumstances full privatization is 
closer to fulfilling the requirements of justice than the current public system.104 
Brighouse provides case studies to argue that this is not evidenced in developing 
countries.105 The sporadic reports which favor privatization are, Brighouse argues, 
insufficient to mandate the switch to this system.  
For the sake of argument, Brighouse assumes Tooley’s position that perhaps 
justice only requires an adequate education.106 Brighouse explains, “Justice requires 
the adequacy principle be fulfilled so it is not sufficient for it merely to be filled; its 
fulfillment has to be guaranteed.”107 Even if Tooley is able to provide a defense for 
the claim that justice requires an adequacy standard, which Brighouse notes is lacking 
in Tooley’s work, Tooley’s market system does not guarantee that the standards of 
justice are fulfilled.108 At best, the standard of adequacy in education only satisfies 
the requirements of justice by chance. Thus, justice between equal citizen in a liberal 
system requires a standard of equality as opposed to a standard of adequacy.  
After examining the debate between adequacy and equality standard for a 
liberal education, I conclude that for a liberal state to fulfill its duty in protecting the 
liberty and political equality of its citizens, liberal education systems must adopt 
standards of equality. Adequacy standards may prove sufficient for preventing 
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children from becoming a burden on the state, but as I argued in Part I, liberal 
institutions must be justified on the individual level of respecting citizen’s current and 
future liberty. Equality standards, as presented by Brighouse, are faithful to the child-
centered justification in their demand that all students be treated as equally deserving 
of the opportunity to frame and pursue their own conceptions of the good within the 
liberal state.  
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PART III: PARENTAL RIGHTS AND FAMILY VALUE 
A perennial objection that liberals face when defending state-mandated 
universal education, particularly of the individual equality-based variety defended in 
Parts I and II, is that such a system violates parental rights and undermines the value 
of the family. Because children are not yet fully rational beings who are capable of 
giving consent, they must be treated paternalistically.109 The question becomes who 
will exercise this paternalistic power. For many theorists, the obvious and complete 
answer is the child’s biological parents.110 However, because of the priority of a 
child’s liberty and future liberty in any liberal theory, parental rights to control over 
their children’s education are disputable.  
In particular, critics of an equal state-mandated education worry that this 
system undermines the right of parents to raise their children within their own 
religious lifestyle. Education could be detrimental to these lifestyles by (1) violating a 
religious doctrine which prohibits education or (2) resulting in the voluntary 
departure of children from the religious way of life after receiving an education. 
Gutmann confronts this first concern and explains, “We rank children’s rights to 
education above their rights to religious freedom since we believe that this restriction 
of their present liberty is necessary to create the conditions for future enjoyments of 
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religious and other freedoms.”111 Thus, while children may mature into adults who 
adhere to a religious doctrine which advocates the immorality of education, this 
religious freedom can be limited in childhood in order to guarantee that this religious 
view and lifestyle is chosen freely as an exercise of liberty and not as a function of 
indoctrination. This argument is analogous to that provided by John Stuart Mill in his 
explanation of why a liberal state can prohibit voluntary slavery contracts. In Chapter 
V of On Liberty, Mill argues that a state can restrict such contracts on the grounds 
that this singular act precludes a lifetime of exercising one’s liberty.112 He says, “The 
principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free.”113 
Gutmann’s argument follows suit. Religious freedom cannot be used to deny a child 
access to an education which allows him/her to understand and exercise liberty in the 
first place.  
A challenge of this religious variety is raised and dismissed in Mozert v. 
Hawkins. Mozert, the parents of students in the Hawkins School District, “claimed 
interference with their parental right to control the religious and moral upbringing of 
their children”114 because the school district utilized reading materials which, the 
parents alleged, featured topics such as feminism and socialism.115 The court ruled 
that the students could be compelled to use these textbooks because they were not 
coerced to accept the ideas in the texts.116 The books were merely used to develop 
citizens through the cultivation of critical thinking skills in areas such as morality and 
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social issues.117 Furthermore, the fact remains that the Mozerts are free to teach their 
children their chosen side of these issues outside of school hours.   
Even classical liberals who defend negative liberty, such as John Stuart Mill, 
are perhaps not as deferential to parental rights over a child’s education as may be 
supposed. Alan Ryan, a Mill scholar, contends that Mill generally “brushes off the 
common view that parents had a natural right to determine the content of their 
children’s teaching.”118 Mill repudiates parents’ conception of their rights over their 
children. He says,  
It is in the case of children that misapplied notions of liberty are a real 
obstacle to the fulfillment by the State of its duties. One would almost think 
that a man’s children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a 
part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with 
his absolute and exclusive control over them, more jealous than of almost any 
interference with his own freedom of action: so much less do the generality of 
mankind value liberty than power.119 
 
Thus, even with the acceptance of the necessity of paternalistic influences on 
children, parental rights over their children are in no way as absolute as rights over 
oneself. Mill denies that parents should be the final authorities over the content of 
their children’s education for the simple fact that “[t]he uncultivated cannot be 
competent judges of cultivation.”120 Mill contends that average parents have an 
insufficient understanding of the education that students require.121 
 Amy Gutmann argues that a parent’s negative liberty to live their life as they 
see fit cannot be extended to rights over other people, including their children.122 She 
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says, “We have no a priori reason to favor one paternalistic agent over another.”123As 
opposed to assuming the role for biological parents, Gutmann maintains that 
paternalistic rights should be given to the agent that is most able to satisfy the 
interests of the child.124 In her conception, parents are given paternalistic rights on the 
condition that they satisfy these needs which “leaves open, at least in theory, the 
possibility that parents will not be the appropriate paternalistic agents for their own 
children.”125 While this argument may appear upon first glance to be offensive to 
society’s conception of the nuclear family, this idea aligns with our common 
conception of guardianship which encompasses parental rights while being 
transferable to other family members, adopted family members, and even the state.  
 Harry Brighouse’s conception of parental rights complements that of 
Gutmann by expanding on the idea that these parental rights are derivative while a 
child’s liberty and right to an education are fundamental. Brighouse argues because 
parental rights are rights over another human being, to affirm the priority of parental 
rights in education is to ignore that children are also individuals.126 Parental rights are 
not fundamental; they are derivative rights based upon the benefit to children for 
development.127 Thus, fundamental rights of the child can trump derivative rights of 
the parents.128  
 In his critique of Brighouse, James Tooley commits Brighouse to the idea that 
authorities can prescribe paths of action for individuals better than the individuals 
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themselves.129 He argues that a centralized state-mandated education, such as the 
autonomy-facilitating education proposed by Brighouse, neglects to take into account 
the variety of experiences and intellectual abilities which would be accommodated 
more efficiently if parents and local authorities maintained control over education.130 
In effect, Tooley accuses Brighouse of unacceptable paternalism in regard to the 
students’ parents. In Tooley’s view, the state is unjustly exercising its power and 
violating parents’ liberty by removing these choices from the parents’ purview.  
Tooley’s objection of unwarranted paternalism both misses Brighouse’s point 
on parental rights as derivative rights and blurs the division between allowing experts 
to shape policy and accepting unrestricted orders from a dictator. The individuals 
affected by educational policy are not the ones who will make the decisions in any 
suggested theory. The consensus is that children are insufficiently developed to be 
entrusted with these decisions themselves. Thus, paternalism is inevitable in regard to 
education.  
As was recognized in Part II, Brighouse’s theory is susceptible to an argument 
from efficiency. For Brighouse, parental rights are merely a pragmatic social 
construct. Brighouse argues that parental rights are merely a convenient vehicle for 
fulfilling all adults’ obligation to children.131 He argues that while all adults have an 
obligation to provide children with the opportunity to become autonomous 
individuals, most adults are not in a position to fulfill this obligation.132 Thus, out of 
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convenience, this duty falls to parents.133 However, if the child’s best interests are 
served by dividing this duty with other adults, then that is the option that should be 
chosen.134 If parental decisions were found to produce a consistent pattern of superior 
outcomes and levels of equality for children, Brighouse would have to defer to the 
parents over supposed experts. However, until this state of affairs obtains (which 
Brighouse appears to see as an unlikely event), paternalistic decisions are entrusted to 
the entity which can best satisfy the educational needs of students: the state’s experts. 
Thus, reliance on educational professionals is not unqualified in the way that one 
would expect from a blindly paternalistic state. Additionally, as argued in Part II, the 
liberal state must guarantee that all students receive an equal standard of education. I 
think that there is a prima facie case for assuming that a decentralized system of 
nearly complete parental control over education, which Tooley suggests, would be 
unable to more effectively fill this requirement than a smaller group of state experts.  
Unsurprisingly, leftist liberal theories are susceptible to the criticism that they 
not only violate parental rights but are also generally unfriendly to the family as an 
institution. In anticipation of this concern, Brighouse incorporates a caveat into his 
principle of transferability of parental rights. His full position reads,  
If children’s interests in general are best served by a division of authority 
between parents and some other agency, then that division is to be preferred 
over giving parents exclusive authority, as long as this division does not 
infringe the fundamental rights of parents to intimate relations with their 
children.135  
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Elsewhere, Brighouse directly confronts the concern that his suggestions are 
antagonistic to the value of the family. To address this issue, he posits an area of 
affairs that is free from state interference by the mere fact that such matters are 
essential to the value of families and that family value is “prior to the value of 
educational equality.”136 He provides two specific examples of activities which 
occupy this intrusion-free space: the right to transmit one’s passion to one’s children 
and the right to share one’s life with one’s children.137 These restrictions on state 
action imply that when children are not at school, parents will be able to teach their 
own religious doctrines and/or comprehensive conceptions of the good to their 
children without fear of the state’s obtrusion. Brighouse contends that his theory 
respects the value of the family because there is no reason to think that the possible 
restrictions imposed by his theory (such as prohibiting private schooling) will affect 
the loving relationships between parents and children that exists during family 
hours.138  
 I offer a supplementary argument to bolster Brighouse’s claim. The family 
value which opponents of an equality standard for state-mandated education purport 
to defend is entirely unique to the family unit. If family value is unique to the familial 
institution, such value cannot be transferred to another entity. Familial rights exist in 
this sphere of the family’s nontransferable value, i.e. value that cannot be found in 
any other institution. Brighouse’s two suggestions of sharing one’s life with one’s 
 
136 Brighouse, "What's Wrong,” 625.  
This priority is described as analogous to the priority of the Liberty Principle in Rawls’s A Theory of 
Justice. 
137 Brighouse, 625.  
138 Brighouse, 626.  
41 
 
children and the ability to share one’s passions with one’s children139 are included 
within the category of familial goods with nontransferable value. Complete parental 
rights over education would allow parents who are “good choosers” to provide their 
children with a positional economic good of an education above the level of equality 
with fellow students. However, positional economic goods can be derived from 
multiple entities outside of the family, such as through volunteer experience within 
the community. Thus, positional economic goods are not part of the unique value of 
the family. It follows that limitations on parents’ ability to choose a superior 
education that provides these positional economic goods do not affect the unique 
value of the family itself. Therefore, equalizing education does not diminish the value 
of the family. 
 Many liberal theorists feel compelled to defend their theories against the 
accusation that their educational proposals negatively affect the familial institution 
either by violating parental rights or undermining the institution’s value. However, a 
closer analysis of these concerns and liberals’ responses renders these objections 
ineffective. By limiting parents’ ability to provide their children with a higher level of 
education than the children’s peers, liberal theorists neither infringe on parental rights 
nor diminish the value of the family.  
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PART IV: MINIMIZED PLURALISM AND LIBERAL EDUCATION 
Other common objections to a state-mandated education rest on the concern 
that such a system renders some ways of ways life inaccessible. By requiring all 
children to receive an education, liberals are removing, in effect even if without 
intention, some ways of life from the realm of citizens’ choices. The opponent of a 
universal mandatory education argues that this violates liberal tenets and minimizes 
the societal pluralism which liberals are supposed to protect.  
Liberals who advocate for a state-mandated education defend themselves from 
such objections through various arguments for the claim that the prioritization of 
individual liberty is not directly translatable into a maximization of pluralism. In On 
Liberty, Mill argues that some ways of life which are entirely antithetical to liberty 
will necessarily be restricted by a liberal society. One such lifestyle is that of 
voluntary slavery.140 Mill maintains that a liberal society will not permit this lifestyle 
and explains that “[t]he principles of freedom cannot require that he should be free 
not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom.”141 In Mill’s 
theory, one cannot pursue a life of slavery even voluntarily; this conception of the 
good is ruled out in principle by a liberal state. Liberalism is justified in restraining 
the pursuit of such lifestyles because it does so for the preservation of liberty.  
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Mill advocates for the protection of pluralism as a means not as an end with 
intrinsic value. This diversity of lifestyles is an experiment for determining which 
conceptions of the good are worth pursuing.142 As people are allowed to pursue 
different lifestyles and plans for creating a good life, individuals within society are 
able to witness the results and determine for themselves which lifestyles are indeed 
worth pursuing. These experiments in different ways of life “would promote and 
destroy pluralism at the same time.”143 As people move between communities and 
start new practices in pursuit of their conceptions of the good, those lifestyles which 
fail to gain new adherents will eventually cease to be a part of society. Pluralism has 
only instrumental value in this sense.  
Alan Ryan, in his article “Mill in a Liberal Landscape,” applies these ideas to 
the landmark Supreme Court case Wisconsin v. Yoder. Ryan claims that in regard to 
Yoder, a liberal could argue based on a child’s freedom of exit that “[i]f the Amish 
cannot preserve their hold over their young people without preventing them from 
learning whatever an American high school might teach them after the age of 
fourteen, they have no business trying to preserve their way of life at all.”144 A liberal 
society has no obligation to maintain the highest possible level of diversity in 
lifestyles; rather, the liberal state retains a duty to preserve the liberty of individuals 
in its citizenry.  
Fear of a child’s exit or the diminution of a community’s population by the 
free choices of its next generation cannot be used to limit a child’s access to 
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education. This would prioritize liberty of groups over the liberty of individuals in a 
way which violates the fundamentals of liberalism. In the article “Fairness to 
Goodness,” John Rawls presents the argument that fairness to individuals takes 
priority above fairness to ways of life.145 He explains,  
[I]ndividuals are not identified with their actual or possible plans but are 
viewed rather as beings that have a capacity for forming, adopting, and 
changing these plans, should they be so moved; and who give priority to 
preserving their liberty in these matters.146 
 
This liberty of individuals to construct and pursue their own conceptions of the good 
must be preserved by the liberal state even at the expense of diminished membership 
in some communities. Group rights are derived from the liberty and free consent of its 
members. So, the fundamental liberty and right of exit of a groups’ members cannot 
be limited merely to preserve a unit with only derivative rights. As argued in Parts I 
and II, education is a matter of fundamental liberty for children; thus, the interests of 
groups cannot be leveraged to abridge this liberty.  
Some liberal theorists argue that diversity of lifestyles is also necessarily 
limited by the need to teach students the political values of mutual respect or 
toleration in a truly liberal state. In order for the state to protect the liberty of its 
whole population, citizens must be allowed equal respect and participation in the 
political sphere. This requirement necessitates that comprehensive conceptions of the 
good which reject this political equality, and their corresponding lifestyles, will be 
made unavailable by the teaching of this political value. John Rawls argues that 
although the liberal state includes a reasonable diversity of lifestyles, the liberal state 
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maintains no obligation to preserve “unreasonable” comprehensive conceptions of the 
good. He says,  
Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of 
reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of 
the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a 
constitutional democratic regime. Political liberalism also supposes that a 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a 
democratic regime.147  
However, liberal theorists must not be overzealous in incorporating these ideals in an 
education system. While students must be taught the political values of respect and 
equality of persons, the teaching of these ideals as comprehensive values outside of 
the political sphere violates the neutrality of the liberal state by actively discouraging 
illiberal lifestyles. Thus, the teaching of values which may limit societal pluralism 
must be justified on the grounds of protecting individuals’ liberty and political 
equality.  
In “Civic Education and Social Diversity,” Amy Gutmann argues that a liberal 
education must teach students the political value of mutual respect. Initially, she 
claims that diversity is limited because liberalism produces a society in which citizens 
“respect each other’s basic rights and opportunities.”148 Later in the same article, 
Gutmann expands this conception of mere tolerance for the sake of civic equality to 
the more expansive requirement of mutual respect.149 She argues that the concept of 
simple tolerance of equality would result in a “live and let live” mentality that is 
irreconcilable with true equality of opportunity.150 Using the example of 
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nondiscrimination in hiring practices, Gutmann contends that tolerance will produce 
discrimination between different societal groups which usually avoid interacting with 
one another while mutual respect (a level of positive regard) amongst all citizens 
would mitigate this problem. Thus, she argues that mutual respect is a necessary 
value in the political sphere of society.151  
Gutmann preempts possible objections to this idea by clarifying that mutual 
respect is only taught to students as compulsory in the political sphere. Gutmann 
explains, 
Political liberalism does not value mutual respect as a nonpolitical virtue–part 
of what living an open-minded or autonomous life entails–but it still embraces 
mutual respect as an essential political virtue because it is a practical 
prerequisite for nondiscriminatory employment practices.152 
 
Tolerance would require merely that different groups coexist within society even if in 
isolation from one another; however, Gutmann sees mutual respect as guaranteeing 
that these groups can interact equally and peacefully as is required in the political 
sphere of a liberal state.  
The teaching of mutual respect necessarily precludes the existence of groups 
in society which hold dogmatic biases against other groups. Gutmann accepts that 
some ways of life are irreconcilable with liberal political systems. She elaborates, 
“Liberal democracy is not committed to enabling all valuable ways of life to flourish, 
no matter what. The dilemma of diversity arises because the value of a conscientious 
way of life apparently comes into conflict with the terms of fair cooperation among 
citizens.”153 According to Gutmann, ways of life which deny equality between 
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persons are suppressed in a liberal state which guarantees such equality in the 
political sphere. This restriction of pluralism is inevitable for a liberal state. 
Eamonn Callan presents another view on these concerns and claims that 
Rawls’s fair terms of cooperation require mutual understanding between citizens.154 
He says that in order to cooperate politically, citizens must be able to see the world 
from the perspective of other citizens. Callan argues, “Because I must seek to 
cooperate with others politically on terms that make sense from their moral 
perspective as well as my own, I must be ready to enter that perspective imaginatively 
so as to grasp its distinctive content.”155 This entails a “positive regard for each 
others’ extra-political beliefs and practices.”156 Even more extensively than 
Gutmann’s suggestion of mutual respect, Callan’s educational system will actively 
discourage many ways of life which reject this style of moral equivalence between 
beliefs.  
To draw this conclusion from Rawls’s standard of fair terms of cooperation is 
a mischaracterization. One must be able to agree to disagree and accept the results of 
a fair political process in Rawls’s system; however, one does not have to fully 
understand or interact with the other’s side in order to reach this agreement. Going 
beyond the teaching of the political value of tolerance and respect, the teaching of 
mutual understanding intentionally discourages students’ free choice of dogmatic or 
illiberal comprehensive conceptions of the good. However, the liberal state must 
maintain neutrality towards all reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good, 
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including illiberal conceptions. Thus, a liberal state cannot mandate the teaching of 
mutual understanding.  
Macedo rejects Callan’s conception of mutual understanding which requires 
appreciation of other beliefs and, instead, argues that civic respect in the political 
sphere should be included in a liberal education. Civic respect acknowledges that 
some comprehensive views are irreconcilable with one another but also contends that 
these disagreements do not necessarily hamper political cooperation, shared political 
principles, or respect between equals.157 The respect required for a liberal political 
system does not necessitate that citizens exhibit the same respect in social 
interactions. Macedo reasons that an education can include critical thinking about the 
political process while also allowing for religious differences and the dogmatic way 
these views may be held.158 Macedo denies the implied inevitability in Callan’s 
system that such respect cannot be confined to only the political realm, and in doing 
so, Macedo provides the space for a greater degree of societal diversity in his theory, 
including illiberal comprehensive conceptions of the good. 
Although liberals must limit some aspects of pluralism in their proposed 
systems, my analysis concludes that most common objections to state-mandated 
education based upon this restricted pluralism are benign. The preservation of 
children’s liberty and interest in education cannot be sacrificed in order to further the 
derivative interests of societal factions. Because a liberal state must maintain and 
propagate a system of political equality between citizens, additional restrictions on 
pluralism will result from an education in toleration or respect. Nevertheless, all such 
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limitations must be justified by arguments based on the fundamental goal of the 
liberal state: preservation of citizens’ liberty to construct and pursue their own 
conceptions of the good.  
 
  
50 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Liberal theorists across the ideological spectrum have debated about 
justifications and standards of state-mandated education in a truly liberal political 
system. However, these discussions have largely neglected to separate these 
arguments into distinct families for individual analysis. Part I concluded that only 
child-centered justifications of a state-mandated education uphold the liberal standard 
of prioritization of liberty while state-centered justifications neglect this requirement. 
Part II defends the positions that these child-centered justifications lead to an equality 
standard for education in a liberal state. Through the examination of the discourse 
between James Tooley and Harry Brighouse, the adequacy standard is rejected as 
failing to treat children as prospective full equals in society with lives to lead.  
 Parts III and IV argue that two perennial objects to equal state-mandated 
education in a liberal state based on parental rights and the preservation of diversity 
do not present a significant obstacle for liberal theorists. Objections to a state-
mandated education which are rooted in the supremacy of parental rights are 
dismissible due to their prioritization of parents’ derivative rights over the 
fundamental liberty of children, while objections based on familial value fail to show 
that state-mandated education in any way affects this unique value. Furthermore, 
concerns that liberal theorists neglect liberal foundations in allowing the restriction of 
pluralism in society are shown to be based on a misunderstanding of the role of 
diversity in a liberal state. Pluralism in a liberal society is a means by which citizens 
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can pursue their own individual conceptions of the good. However, their ability to 
form and pursue this conception is prior in importance to this diversity in society. 
Although an education which includes liberal political values renders some lifestyles 
unavailable, these restrictions on pluralism are justified by the liberal state’s duty of 
preserving citizens’ equal respect in the political sphere as well as their liberty to 
pursue their own conceptions of the good.   
 Harry Brighouse’s theory, as presented in School Choice and Social Justice, 
aligns with both the liberal child-centered justification and equality standard of 
education while providing adequate answers to both perennial objections presented in 
this work. Within his own theory, Brighouse admits to a substantial problem with 
translating this equality standard into a reality. In particular, Brighouse claims to 
possess only a partial answer to the “bottomless pit problem” for equal education: a 
situation in which the education of naturally gifted students would be neglected 
completely in order to dedicate resources to the segment of the student populace who 
may never be able to achieve the success of the highest achieving students.159 
Additionally, Brighouse’s attempts to reconcile an equality standard with real world 
constraints forces him to employ the idea of deserved inequality, yet this concept is 
neither sufficiently explained nor justified.160 To build upon the arguments in this 
paper, further work is needed to address these complications in Brighouse’s theory.  
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